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Introduction
Averroes discusses the metaphysics of human epistemology extensively.1 Several of his
works, most prominently his three commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, attempt to explain
how finite, particular minds interact with universal, eternal intelligibles.2 These three
commentaries are named (according their lengths): the Short Commentary, the Middle
Commentary, and the Long Commentary. Current scholarship focuses on the two longer
commentaries, likely because the Short Commentary is too short to provide ground for
discussion and does not articulate Averroes’ mature position on the metaphysics of human
epistemology. There is no consensus as to which of the two longer commentaries presents
Averroes’ final articulation of the metaphysics of human epistemology.3 Those who maintain
that Averroes wrote the Middle Commentary last tend to minimize the differences between the
two accounts.4 This paper does not take a position on the chronology of Averroes’ works. Rather,
it seeks to demonstrate that, even if Averroes wrote the Middle Commentary last, the accounts of
the metaphysics of human epistemology in the Middle and Long commentaries differ
substantively.

1

A version of this paper first appeared in Dialogue Vol. 59, No. 2-3, pages 269-273.

Richard Taylor, “Averroes: Religious Dialectic and Aristotelian Philosophical Thought,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 190.
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Richard Taylor, Averroes, 190-192; Alfred Ivry. “Averroes’ Middle and Long Commentaries on the ‘De
anima’,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy: A Historical Journal 5, no. 1 (1995).

Alfred Ivry, introduction to Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Alfred Ivry (Provo:
Bringham Young University Press, 2002), xvii.
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The Dispute on Chronology and its Implications
Most scholars who publish on Averroes’ metaphysics of epistemology either assume or argue
that the Middle Commentary was written before the Long Commentary and that these accounts
differ substantively.5 However, one of the leading scholars in the field, Alfred Ivry, compellingly
argues that textual evidence indicates the Middle Commentary was composed after the Long
Commentary.6 In the introduction to his translation of the Middle Commentary, Ivry describes
the Middle Commentary as an overview, written for lay-people, where Averroes simplifies the
concepts he expounds upon more fully in the Long Commentary.7 Ivry does not deny that the
Middle and Long commentaries contain differences, but he minimizes their significance.8 He
writes: “In the Middle Commentary, Averroes discreetly shows in various ways that he is aware
of his own social and political context. He has presumably wrestled the text to the ground to his
own satisfaction, and is now prepared to present it to a wider audience, in an abridged and more
‘politically correct’ format.”9 Ivry explains that when he mentions social and political pressure
he is suggesting that Averroes sought to accommodate to Islamic conservatism when he wrote
the Middle Commentary.10 The question is, Are the differences between the Middle and Long
Taylor, Averroes, 190-192; Deborah Black, “Conjunction and the Identity of the Knower and Known in
Averroes,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73, no. 1 (Winter 1999), accessed October 7, 2016,
http://rx9vh3hy4r.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajo
urnal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Conjunction+and+the+identity+of+knower+and+known+in+Averroes&rft.jtitle=
AMERICAN+CATHOLIC+PHILOSOPHICAL+QUARTERLY&rft.au=Black%2C+DL&rft.date=1999&rft.pub=A
MER+CATHOLIC+PHILOSOPHICAL+ASSOC&rft.issn=1051-3558&rft.eissn=21538441&rft.volume=73&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=159&rft.epage=184&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=00
0081438700007.
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Ivry, Averroes’ Middle and Long Commenatries.
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Ivry, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s, xvii.
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Ivry, Middle Commentary, xvii.
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commentaries substantive, or are they explained by Ivry’s theory of abridgement, simplification,
and political and religious correctness? This question will be answered by surveying each
account individually and comparing the two accounts in light of their political and religious
context.
Averroes Position in the Long Commentary
Two concerns drive Averroes’ discussion of the metaphysics of human epistemology in
the Long Commentary on De Anima: 1) the nature of the theoretical intelligibles and 2) the
nature of the material intellect.11 These two concerns play out in three questions: a) Are the
intelligibles generable and corruptible or eternal?, b) How can the material intellect be one while
numerous people actualize intelligibles in it?, and c) If the material intellect is neither prime
matter nor form, what is its nature?12 He frames this discussion by describing the material
intellect as: “That which is potentially all intentions . . . of the universal material forms, but it is
not any of the beings in act before it itself intellects [any of them].”13 It is important to note that
this description does not include any mention of the soul.
Averroes explores two possibilities regarding the relationship between human minds and the
material intellect. The first is that each particular person possesses his own material intellect.
Averroes rejects this possibility because, among other things, this would imply that no two
people can grasp the same truth.14 The intelligibles received by two different individuals could
be related, but could not actually be identical. However, it is apparent that, when two people

11

Taylor, Averroes, 192.

Ibn Rushd, “Long Commentary on the Soul: Book III,” in Classical Arabic Philosophy, ed. and trans.
Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 342.
12

13

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 335-336.

14

Taylor, Averroes, 192.
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grasp a truth (for example, 2 + 2 = 4), they are grasping the same truth, not just similar truths.
Thus, it does not seem possible that the material intellect is particular to each individual.
The second possibility is that the material intellect is universal for all intellecting beings.
Averroes reasons that, if all humans are linked to the same material intellect, then, if one person
actualizes an intelligible, all persons, due to their connection with the same material intellect,
would also receive this intelligible. Because it is clear that one person can grasp an intelligible
without all other people grasping that intelligible, Averroes rejects the possibility that there is
one material intellect conjoined to all humans.15
Averroes resolves these difficulties by positing that: “Obviously a man does not actually
intellect except because of the conjunction of the actually intelligible with him.”16 This actual
intelligible must be one matter-form (he uses these terms analogously) unit. Thus, the
conjunction of a person with this actual intelligible can occur either through the aspect of this
actual intelligible which is like matter (the material intellect)—a possibility which he has already
ruled out through the reductio ad absurdum arguments outlined above—or through the aspect
which is like form, the imagined intentions. The imagined intentions are particular to each
individual, but can be actualized by the Active Intellect, and made to be “actual movers”17 of the
material intellect. Throughout the Long Commentary Averroes portrays the Active Intellect as
independent and separate from the particular human. This reading is supported by the translator’s
decision to capitalize the term, “Active Intellect” in the Long Commentary.

15

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 344.

16

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 345.
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Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 346.
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Thus, Averroes answers the three questions above: a) The actual intelligibles are generable
and corruptible only to the extent they are related to the imagined intentions.18 b) The material
intellect can be one while numerous people actualize intelligibles in it because they are not
conjoined to these actual intelligibles through the material intellect, but rather through the
imagined intentions.19 c) The material intellect is not form, matter, or the union of the two, but is
rather a “fourth genus” whose nature is receptivity.20
Averroes Position in the Middle Commentary
Averroes begins his discussion by comparing the views of previous commentators and
concluding that the material intellect is made up of “of the disposition found in us and of an
intellect conjoined to this disposition. As conjoined to the disposition, it is a disposed intellect,
not an intellect in act; though, as not conjoined to this disposition, it is an intellect in act; while,
in itself, this intellect is the Agent Intellect.”21 In addition to this receptive capacity, the soul also
possesses the capability to produce intelligibles. This is the capacity which is called “agent.”22
Throughout The Middle Commentary, Averroes compares the intellect and its reception of
intelligibles to sense perception. He argues that the rational faculty, unlike the sensory faculties,
remains unmixed with that which it receives.23 The Agent Intellect, according to this account,

18

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 343.

19

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 349.

20

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 348.

Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Trans. Alfred Ivry (Provo: Brigham Young
University, 2001), 111.
21
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Averroes, Middle Commentary, 112.

23

Averroes, Middle Commentary, 113.
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intellects intelligibles when conjoined with humans and intellects itself when not conjoined to
humans.24
The Middle and Long Commentaries Present Differing Accounts
The differences between the Long and Middle commentaries on De Anima can be seen in two
passages. The Long Commentary reads:
Therefore, to say of the child that he potentially intellects can be understood in two ways:
one of which is because the imagined forms that are in him are potentially intelligible,
whereas the second is because the material intellect that naturally receives the intelligible
of these imagined forms is a potential recipient and potentially conjoined with us.25
Here, while the imagined intentions are associated with a particular person, their being made
actually intelligible is expressed passively because, as expressed more explicitly elsewhere in the
Long Commentary, they are only made actually intelligible by an independent (separate from
individual persons) Active Intellect.26 Additionally, the material intellect is only potentially, not
necessarily, conjoined to the particular human.
A key passage in The Middle Commentary reads: “It is clear that two functions exist in our
soul, one of which is the producing of intelligibles and the other is the receiving of them. By
virtue of producing intelligibles, it is called agent, while, by virtue of receiving them, it is called
passive, though in itself it is one thing.”27
These two passages show that Averroes describes both the active and potential intellects
differently in his two accounts. In the Long Commentary he ascribes the ability to make

24

Averroes, Middle Commentary, 117.

25

Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 345.
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Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 346.
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Averroes, Middle Commentary, 112.
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imagined intentions actual intelligibles to a power separate from the particular human, while he
locates this power within the soul in the Middle Commentary.
The contrast is more pronounced with respect to the material intellect. In the Long
Commentary Averroes speaks of the material intellect as only potentially conjoined to an
individual. He dedicates a major portion of his argument to establishing that the material intellect
is a fourth genus, separate from the particular mind and one for all of humanity, whose nature is
receptivity. But in the Middle Commentary Averroes locates the receptive capacity within the
particular soul, and rejects the possibility of a substance whose nature is receptivity. He writes:
“This view [of the other commentators] also entails an absurd position: that there should be a
separate substance, the existence of which occurs in disposition and potentiality.”28 To avoid this
absurdity he posits that the material intellect only exists as conjoined to a human.29
There are differences in Averroes’ two accounts, not just in individual passages, but also in
argumentative thrusts. Are these differences substantive or only a result of a shift in how
Averroes presents his ideas?
The Differences Between the Middle and Long Commentaries Are Substantive
While Ivry’s theories of abridgement and simplification are somewhat plausible (the Middle
Commentary is both shorter and simpler), they cannot explain away the directly conflicting
argumentative thrusts of the two works. Moreover, if, as Ivry argues,30 Averroes was influenced
by a desire to be politically and religiously correct between writing the Middle and Long
commentaries, he would not have tweaked his account in the way he did.

28

Averroes, Middle Commentary, 111.
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Averroes, Middle Commentary, 111.
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Ivry, Middle Cpommentary, xxvi.
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If the Long Commentary were composed before the Middle Commentary, then the drift of
Averroes’ thought would have been against, rather than in accord, with political and religious
pressure. The religious and political pressure Averroes experienced is epitomized in Averroes’
interaction with al-Ghazali, a thinker whom he devoted a whole work to refuting.31 One of the
major emphasis of al-Ghazali’s religiously conservative thought is a focus on the doctrine of
divine power and its ensuing total causality.32 If Averroes were going to come more in line with
this pressure, he would have moved from a position which emphasized particular human
involvement in the epistemological process in the Long Commentary to one which emphasized
divine causality in the Middle Commentary. Rather, if Ivry’s chronology is correct, the exact
opposite is the case. He moves from emphasizing the role of intellects which transcend the
particular human in the Long Commentary to a portrayal which endows humans with more
power and involvement in the epistemological process in the Middle Commentary. This move is
against, rather than in accord with, political and religious pressure, so it seems only a genuine
conceptual change would lead Averroes to change his portrayal in this way.
Conclusion
Most scholars see real differences between Averroes’ two main treatments of the metaphysics
of human epistemology. Ivry’s understanding of the order in which Averroes wrote his
commentaries on De Anima leads him to attempt to explain away the differences between the
Middle and Long commentaries. He fails in this attempt because his arguments from abridgement
and simplification are inadequate, and his argument from political and religious pressure

31
Ibn-Rushd. “The Incoherence of the Incoherence: First Discussion,” in Classical Arabic Philosophy, ed.
and trans. Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 295-308.

Michael Marmura, “Al-Ghazali,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter
Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137-154.
32
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highlights, rather than minimizes, the differences between the Middle and Long commentaries.
The differences between the two accounts are substantive, not superficial.
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